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EU Relations with “Emerging” 
Strategic Partners: Brazil, India and 
South Africa
Natalie M. Hess
In her speech on the BRICS and other emerging powers on 1 February 2012, the EU 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Lady Catherine Ashton, 
stated that the EU needs “to invest in these countries as strategic partners in a very 
strong and dynamic, bilateral relationship [...] We need to do that because it is in our in­
terest to do it.” 
Analysis
  The EU’s strategic partnerships have been established in an uncoordinated manner; 
however, this has not been accidental. All of the EU’s “emerging” strategic partners 
carry economic weight, but even more importantly, they have political weight and 
(potentially) important regional and/or global roles to play. 
  Consequently, they are essential partners for shaping a globalized, interdependent 
and multipolar world confronted with key challenges and with a need for inter­
national cooperation and global governance. They are truly “formative powers” 
in that they have enough influence to shape the present and coming world order. 
These countries are essential partners for the EU in terms of its goals of building “ef­
fective multilateralism” and of raising its own international profile.
  While the EU was initially keen to establish strong links between its bilateral and 
biregional strategic partnerships, since mid-2010 the official statements have put a 
stronger focus on working with bilateral partners more independently from bire­
gional relations. 
  The “emerging” strategic partners have an interest in being officially “selected” by 
the EU, a traditional or “established” (extraregional) power. Being recognized and 
acknowledged as important players in regional as well as global terms serves their 
international and regional power profile as well as their status within the interna­
tional hierarchy. 
  Strategic partnerships generally are and will be an important foreign policy tool in 
a multipolar world. They are part of the strategy of cooperating while competing.
Keywords:  EU, strategic partnerships, new powers in shaping globalization (“Gestal­
tungsmächte”), multipolarity
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The EU’s Relations with “Emerging/Emerged 
Partners”
The Treaty of Lisbon is supposed to give the EU a 
stronger, more coherent voice on the world stage 
and to offer more continuity in EU foreign poli­
cy and in the union’s relations with partners. It 
has introduced new posts and working structures, 
most notably the EU High Representative for For­
eign Affairs and Security Policy and the Europe­
an External Action Service (EEAS). The EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Lady Catherine Ashton, has outlined three 
priorities for her mandate: creating a new foreign 
policy service, the EEAS; the European neighbor­
hood; and the EU’s relations with strategic part­
ners (Ashton 2010). It is clear that the first and third 
priorities are closely related: in order to deal with 
strategic partners, the EU needs a properly func­
tioning EEAS. In her February speech, Lady Ash­
ton differentiated between so-called “established 
partnerships” (with the USA, Russia, Japan and 
Canada) and relationships with “powers that are 
emerging or have emerged” (referring to China, 
India, Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia) (Ashton 
2012). Generally, this listing is in line with the fact 
that the EU has ten (bilateral) strategic partners 
at the moment – namely, Brazil, Canada, China, 
India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South 
Korea and the United States. The partnerships 
with so­called “emerging/emerged partners” have 
all been established since 2003. They are said to 
be characterized by common interests and shared 
values. Joint Action Plans outlining the policy ar­
eas for common political action have been formu­
lated; corresponding working groups on sever­
al issue areas have been established; and (annu­
al) high­level summits have been held. What can 
be learned from analyzing the EU’s strategic part­
nerships with emerging countries, especially from 
the Brazilian, Indian and South African cases?
No Unified EU Interest
The strategic partnerships with so­called “emerg­
ing/emerged partners” have been established in 
an uncoordinated manner. No uniform political 
process led up to the establishment of this for­
mat. Thus, these strategic partnerships have been 
arranged individually – on a case­by­case basis – 
and mostly autonomously from each other. They 
have predominantly been introduced because 
of the (combined) initiatives of the Commission 
president, the commissioners, and particular units 
(primarily the unit heads) within the European 
Commission, as well as individual EU member 
states (EU­MS). Almost naturally, the nationalities 
of the persons involved within the EU institutions 
have played a role in whether relations with a spe­
cific country have been intensified or not. Further­
more, the historic and cultural relations of partic­
ular EU­MS with the emerging countries have al­
so been a significant factor. 
Generally, the strategic partnerships have been 
an attempt by the EU institutions to raise the EU’s 
profile as an interesting interlocutor in the eyes of 
these emerging countries. Some Commission rep­
resentatives have indicated that the establishment 
of a strategic partnership has also depended on 
how successfully the European Commission has 
“sold” the idea to the EU Council or the EU­MS. In 
any case, some EU­MS already maintained inten­
sified relations with a few of the emerging pow­
ers (national strategic partnerships). The question 
that thus arises is why EU­MS have had an inter­
est in EU strategic partnerships even though there 
is no joint EU foreign and security policy in place. 
The EU-MS have displayed diff erent reasons for 
seeking EU strategic part ner ships with specif­
ic countries. Firstly, there is surely a certain ex­
tent of normatively motivated interest in support­
ing the “Europeanization” of European foreign 
policy. Secondly, some EU­MS have also sought 
to give new impetus to their national relations 
with a particular country by using the EU stra­
tegic partnership for national purposes (for ex­
ample, to bring a fresh dynamic to historical re­
lations). This is the same reason some of the bi­
regional partnerships have been introduced. For 
example, the EU­MS have been interested in en­
suring that a particular country or region fea­
tures high enough on the EU agenda because it 
represents the main focus of their respective na­
tional foreign policies, primarily due to econom­
ic interests or historical relations. This has result­
ed in particular (coalitions of) member states’ set­
ting and pushing of the agenda for the establish­
ment of specific strategic partnerships – for in­
stance, Germany, Portugal and Sweden’s interest 
in an EU–Brazil strategic partnership. Thirdly, the 
EU­MS have also sought to complement their na­
tional relations with emerging countries by using 
the EU as an additional framework for speaking 
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to them. The EU level therefore serves as a means 
of multiplying influence. Fourthly, due to interna­
tional power shifts, EU­MS face the mid­ to long­
term risk that “emerging countries” will lose in­
terest in dealing with them on a bilateral basis. 
Thus, the EU level is a welcome channel for stay­
ing engaged with these new powers in the future. 
This is mostly the case for “smaller” EU­MS, but 
it increasingly holds true for the “bigger” EU­MS 
as well. Sometimes, however, there has been ob­
jection by EU­MS to an EU strategic partnership 
because they have preferred to keep their engage­
ment with “emerging powers” at the national lev­
el (opposing Europeanization), have preferred a 
different bilateral strategic partner in a region, or 
were concerned about possible negative reactions 
from other countries in the respective regions (for 
example, Argentina being jealous of Brazil’s stra­
tegic partnership with the EU). 
No Unified Political Process, but No “Accident” 
Either
Generally, the EU’s strategic partners are essential 
actors in shaping an interdependent and multipo­
lar world, international regimes and global gover­
nance. They are truly “formative powers” in the 
sense that they have the power and/or influence 
to shape the present decade, and presumably the 
coming decades. These countries are crucial “part­
ners” for the EU, with its goal of creating a rule­
based international system built on multilateral­
ism and global governance – the “effective mul­
tilateralism” narrative, which is also articulated 
in the European Security Strategy (2003). In ad­
dition, the EU as such has an interest in strategic 
rhetoric, in being recognized and acknowledged 
as an international actor and part ner. In essence, 
strategic partnerships are political agreements. As 
an EU official has said, “there is a political spin 
about them.” They should primarily be seen as a 
declaration of interest in cooperating more close­
ly: the starting point of a process that ideally re­
sults in joint political action. There is no automatic 
convergence of values or interests. Here it makes 
sense to make use of management literature on 
strategic partnerships: The respective actors have 
voluntarily “partnered strategically” in order to 
adapt to the changing international environment. 
They remain auton omous actors. When interests 
overlap, they can form interest coalitions to im­
prove their market position or achieve their inter­
ests. Even though they are competitors in various 
dimensions, such as trade, they see a comparative 
advantage in teaming up in certain cases. It is a 
strategy of cooperating while competing.
The various strategic partnerships have come 
into place quite differently; in some cases the EU 
has offered this “status,” and in others the strate­
gic partner has requested it. Once Brazil became 
the official bilateral strategic partner in Latin 
America, Mexico lobbied behind the scenes to ob­
tain the same status. This demonstrates that there 
is no universal political process for becoming the 
EU’s strategic partner. In some cases there have 
indeed been parallels between two bilateral strate­
gic partnerships. For example, once India had be­
come the EU’s strategic partner in 2004, the idea of 
using the same tool in the Brazilian case emerged 
within the former Directorate-General RELEX (in 
charge of external relations) of the EU Commis­
sion. Yet, in 2010 there was still little coordination 
or exchange between the officials in charge of bi­
lateral strategic partnerships. There appeared to 
be only limited exchange at the “head of unit” lev­
el. Furthermore, even though Lady Ashton was, 
and is, also the vice president of the European 
Commission, information exchange between the 
Commission and Ashton’s Cabinet had evolved 
slowly. 
Indeed, as already noted above, the EU’s stra­
tegic partnerships have been established in an un­
coordinated manner. However, they are no “ac­
cident,” as is sometimes believed (Renard 2012). 
Rather, the EU has, on a case­by­case basis, recog­
nized that the countries in question have not only 
economic but also political clout in regional and/
or international affairs. All of the EU’s strategic 
partners are either major economic players or dis­
play considerably high growth rates and are mem­
bers of the G20. Consequently, it is no wonder that 
the EU is working towards free trade agreements 
in most cases: its strategic partners are important 
trading partners and offer interesting markets for 
European goods. Nevertheless, what is more im­
portant about the strategic partnerships is the fact 
that these so­called emerging countries have sig­
nificant political power and influence as well as 
(potentially) important regional and/or global 
roles to play. This is the main common ground of 
all strategic partnerships. The emerging countries 
are important partners in bilateral, regional and 
especially international (global) affairs – whether 
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they seek a proactive role or not. Sometimes they 
are particularly important partners because of 
their influence in certain issue areas and policies, 
irrespective of whether they are active or passive, 
and simply because of their economic weight and 
(even more) their political and international influ­
ence. The strategic partners are also viewed as po­
tential bridge­builders and vote­pullers in inter­
national fora. The EU’s strategic partnership with 
South Africa, for example, is not primarily about 
development as is often believed (Gratius 2011). 
South Africa is one of the major economic power­
houses in (Southern) Africa. It is a major locus for 
Euro pean foreign direct investment; it undertakes 
con siderable technological exchange with the EU; 
and it has played a significant role in driving re­
gional institution­building – for example, for Afri­
ca’s security architecture – which makes it an im­
portant political partner in the region and inter­
nationally. South Africa is often perceived as Afri­
ca’s representative, something which is also quite 
a challenge for South Africa as it does not want to 
be portrayed as a regional hegemon or bully vis­
à­vis its African partners (Hess 2010). As a South 
African official has stressed, “South Africa never 
claims to speak on behalf of Africa.”
The Bilateral–Biregional Link
The EU has traditionally followed a region­to­re­
gion approach in its foreign relations. However, 
in 2003 the EU began to establish strategic part­
nerships with emerging powers as bilateral part­
ners. At the time, the engines of (bi)regionalism 
were stuttering. Moreover, it was proving diffi­
cult for the EU to interact within biregional frame­
works because the biregional partners were gen­
erally less “supranationalized” than the EU. Even 
though the EU has tried to export its own model, 
which has again lost relevance since the European 
financial crisis, the parties involved in the region­
al settings have often had no interest in “suprana­
tionalizing” their region. This means that the EU 
has lacked a direct interlocutor in the form of a 
corresponding institution and has instead dealt 
with a group of countries with possibly conflict­
ing interests. Moreover, negotiations on free trade 
agreements have often stagnated (for example, 
MERCOSUR in the past). The establishment of bi­
lateral strategic partnerships, for example, with 
Brazil and South Africa (less so in the Indian case), 
has also been an attempt to “elect” direct interloc­
utors and cooperation partners within regional 
settings in order to overcome the biregional stag­
nation. The EU has looked for like­minded and 
presumably powerful countries within a region 
that are capable of influencing their respective re­
gional neighbors and pushing the regional agen­
da in a direction favorable for the EU (Hess 2009, 
2010). These strategic partnerships with bilateral 
partners have thus marked a shift in the EU’s pol­
icy focus. However, this does not mean that the 
EU has started to neglect its biregional relations. 
Rather, the EU’s bilateral strategic partners have 
been chosen because they are positioned at the 
nexus of regional and global politics. Whether the 
regional or the global level is more important de­
pends on the particular partner and its respective 
power profile. Regional affairs have surely been 
more relevant in those cases in which the EU has 
also been cultivating biregional relations – for ex­
ample, EU relations with the Latin American and 
Caribbean states or with the African Union.
While the EU was initially keen to emphasize 
the link between its biregional and bilateral stra­
tegic partnerships, the emphasis in official state­
ments has changed since mid­2010: bilateral and 
biregional strategic partnerships are still linked, 
but less so than before. Whereas initially it was 
believed that adding a bilateral strategic partner 
to the biregional format would be beneficial to bi­
regional relations (that is, that the “regional pow­
er” would drive regional integration or be a role 
model for the region in terms of democratic insti­
tutions), the nexus between bilateral and biregion­
al strategic partnerships has decreased in impor­
tance. The importance of cooperation at the glob­
al level has increased with respect to the bilater­
al strategic partnerships. Consequently, the EU’s 
main focus is now on working with bilateral stra­
tegic partners more independently from, but not 
irrespective of, biregional settings. The bilater­
al partnerships today focus predominantly on bi­
lateral and international issues. Presumably, this 
shift in EU foreign policy is due to several fac­
tors, possibly including a learning process on the 
part of the EU: Firstly, as stated above, the respec­
tive regional organizations are not as institution­
alized relative to the EU, and more importantly, 
the countries in the respective regions are not in­
terested in changing this in the near future. Sec­
ondly, over the years the EU has come to recog­
nize that the emerging powers are too “big” and 
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too important on an international scale to only 
deal with them within the biregional framework. 
Thirdly, the regional neighbors do not necessar­
ily “follow” the regional “powerhouses.” Conse­
quently, South Africa does not represent Africa; 
Brazil does not speak for Latin America; and India 
does not stand for South Asia. Fourthly, the bilat­
eral strategic partners themselves do not necessar­
ily want to be engaged in their respective regions 
or are very careful not to be seen as regional he­
gemons. They want to work independently from 
their regions, “transcending the regional scene” 
somewhat.
The Strategic Partners’ Interests
The EU is an interesting partner for the emerg­
ing countries for various reasons: It is an impor­
tant trade player/partner, market and foreign di­
rect investor. Furthermore, it is also an interest­
ing “bilateral” partner – for example, when Bra­
zil seeks cooperation in the fields of education, 
training and exchange. It is also often a “histori­
cal” or “cultural” partner as it includes member 
states with close historical or cultural ties to the 
emerging countries (for example, India and Great 
Britain). The EU is also an important cooperation 
partner in global fora. More significantly, howev­
er, the strategic partners use the rhetoric of coop­
eration strategically: they have an interest in being 
officially “selected” by the EU, a “traditional” and 
“established” extraregional power. Even though 
the EU is an international actor “sui generis,” it 
represents the “West” and the “North” or, basical­
ly, the traditional powers that have long dominat­
ed the international system and the internation­
al economy – though this has, of course, changed 
since the international economic and financial cri­
sis with which Europe has been struggling. In or­
der to expand their power, emerging powers use 
various mechanisms. One of them is the recogni­
tion of their regional and international power sta­
tus by so­called established powers. The EU’s ac­
knowledgement is also important because of its 
position outside of the particular region: emerg­
ing powers are interested in being “recognized” 
by extraregional actors. This act of recognition – 
becoming the EU’s strategic partner – is utilized 
by the respective countries to increase their inter­
national and regional power profile and diversi­
fy their foreign relations. It signifies prestige and 
is one rung on the ladder up the international hi­
erarchy. Even though this new status can create 
jealousy, especially among regional neighbors, 
the EU’s strategic partners can always point to the 
fact that in most cases this status was offered to 
them and that they have not been the official driv­
ing force in the process. It is therefore quite con­
venient for countries to be “chosen” by an exter­
nal actor. 
The Post-Lisbon EU Foreign Policy Machinery
The EU High Representative is supposed to rep­
resent the EU in foreign and security policy and 
to ensure the presentation of a consistent, coher­
ent and continuous external image to the world. 
The EEAS, the EU’s foreign service, is the sup­
porting office. Even though the strategic partner­
ships with emerging countries are individual pro­
cesses with potentially different aims, coordina­
tion and strategic policy guidance need to be in­
creased in order to make effective use of this tool. 
First of all, it should be emphasized that establish­
ment of a new foreign service is a time­consum­
ing and long­term task. The working mechanisms 
are still in their infancy and there is a considerable 
amount of learning still taking place. Some impli­
cations of the Lisbon Treaty are only becoming 
evident now as the treaty is put into practice. As 
the EEAS is staffed by officials from the EU-MS, 
the Council secretariat and the Commission, it in­
volves not only 27 different nationalities but also 
different bureaucratic cultures. The EEAS’s basic 
structure was set up in 2011, and the organization 
only started to move into one building in Brussels 
in 2012. Furthermore, the heads of the approxi­
mately 140 EU delegations around the world are 
only being appointed incrementally. At the same 
time, the EEAS has been expected to function. Lo­
cally, the delegations have often been “headless.” 
They also face capacity constraints in terms of per­
sonnel, administration, infrastructure or budget. 
Furthermore, some of the officials at these delega­
tions are not necessarily trained diplomats. While 
previous Commission delegations pre dominantly 
worked on Commission topics – that is, commu­
nitarized policies such as trade or climate – the 
EEAS now also has to actively deal with other pol­
icy areas such as security.
Delegations now chair the local meetings of EU 
heads of missions and various working groups. In 
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theory, the EEAS is a service provider to the EU 
institutions and member states; however, even 
though the EEAS is supposed to “take over” from 
the rotating presidency, there are sometimes con­
flicting interpretations of the scope and quali­
ty of this “take­over” between the parties on the 
ground. The exchange of information is at times 
limited. The quality of cooperation between the 
embassies of the EU­MS and the delegations de­
pends on the local actors. Generally, it takes time 
to turn the previous Commission delegations into 
EU delegations. Moreover, the latter need “room 
to maneuver,” yet their work needs to evolve in 
coordination with EU­MS. It is nevertheless im­
portant to note that both European actors and the 
strategic partners value having a local EU delega­
tion.
In the post-Lisbon era the (annual) summit di­
plomacy, which characterizes the strategic part­
nerships, has continued. Critics of the summit 
process rightly argue that summits had already 
been taking place before strategic partnerships ex­
isted and that they are not exclusive to strategic 
partners. Yet practitioners from both parties un­
derscore the fact that summits are an indispens­
able part of the partnership process, even though 
they entail a great deal of preparation and there is 
sometimes frustration with the results. It is none­
theless essential to systematically prepare and 
evaluate these summits. Additionally, sum mit di­
plomacy needs to be accompanied by regular, re­
ciprocal (high­level) diplomatic visits and work­
ing meetings. 
The fact that Lady Ashton is often accompa­
nied or “replaced” by Herman van Rompuy, the 
president of the European Council, and José M. 
Barroso, the president of the EU Commission, 
has resulted in the partner countries’ perception 
that there is still no single EU telephone number 
to call. Even though some strategic partners, for 
example, India, prefer to work with nation­states 
instead of the supranational EU, they increasing­
ly regard the EU as a “trend.” Third countries do 
see which policy areas have been communitarized 
and when it makes sense to talk to EU institutions 
instead of approaching (a multitude of) individu­
al EU member states. They know how to play off 
EU members against one another. Yet as Brazil­
ian, South African and Indian officials have said, 
“the EU is more than just the sum of its parts.” 
They welcome the Treaty of Lisbon and the end of 
the rotating presidency. The latter change is also 
in the EU’s interest, as there now is the chance of 
formulating long­term EU interests and not hav­
ing a biannual change in priorities, interests and 
contact persons. The strategic partners currently 
find it challenging to work with the EU in poli­
cy areas of shared competence. Some third­coun­
try officials say working processes become a game 
of “feathering one’s own nest” among EU institu­
tions and EU-MS, making it difficult for the part­
ners to identify the actors in charge. Thus, third 
countries would actually encourage the forma­
tion of a coherent, unified European voice. In 
their view only Europe as a whole can be influen­
tial in a multipolar world. Still, knowledge about 
and interest in the EU is generally rather limited 
in the partner countries. For example, as an Indi­
an official has said, the EU is often regarded as 
a rather “strange or very complex animal in In­
dia.” The number of people in the EU’s strategic­
partner countries dealing with the EU on a pro­
fessional basis is limited, and the EU therefore 
has to deal with capacity constraints on the part­
ners’ side. Generally, local media attention to La­
dy Ashton’s visits to strategic­partner countries is 
limited. Thus, the EU’s public diplomacy needs to 
be improved.
The uncoordinated coming­into­place of the 
strategic partnerships proves that this process has 
not been guided by an overarching EU­foreign 
policy “strategy.” The European Security Strategy 
(2003) also remained vague on strategic partner­
ships. This correlates with the impression gained 
by the author in Brussels – namely, that there has 
been hardly any coordination between units or 
desks. Consequently, knowledge about the EU’s 
strategic partners as a group has been rather scat­
tered for a long time. This needs to be improved 
with/in the EEAS. More exchange and coordina­
tion between the desks and units concerned is 
particularly important for policy coherence. Fur­
thermore, strategic policy guidance and leader­
ship from the Brussels “center of power” (a sort 
of policy planning office) is needed. The delega­
tions do not have the capacity to draw parallels 
to other strategic partners or to draft a long­term 
plan for dealing with them as a group. Close co­
ordination between the EEAS and EU­MS, partic­
ularly with their foreign ministries and embas­
sies, is essential. The fact that the (revision of) 
strategic partnerships featured on the agenda of 
the European Council in September 2010 as well 
as those of the foreign affairs councils and Gym­
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nich meetings (informal meetings of EU foreign 
affairs ministers) in 2010 and 2011 should be wel­
comed. However, continuous exchange and coor­
dination also has to take place on a working level 
between the EEAS and the EU­MS’ foreign minis­
tries. The EEAS needs to deal with foreign and se­
curity policy topics more intensively. The rise of 
the so­called emerging powers represents not on­
ly a major foreign policy challenge in itself, but al­
so a major, if not the biggest, incentive for Europe 
to work more closely together on a common Euro­
pean foreign policy that increases the EU’s politi­
cal weight and “shaping power.” 
Strategic Partnerships as a Foreign Policy Tool
The EU’s strategic partnerships are more than just 
rhetoric. It is important to see them in terms of a 
process and an international business format. The 
question is whether and how these frameworks 
will be used, further developed and prioritized by 
the EU High Representative and the EEAS. Stra­
tegic (long­term) policy guidance, preferably for­
mulated by the EU High Representative and a 
connected Brussels policy planning office, is cru­
cial. Similarly, close exchange between the EU in­
stitutions (such as the EEAS and the EU Commis­
sion), or rather the relevant policy desks and units, 
is essential in order to generate policy coherence. 
Such exchange, policy coherence and strategic 
policy guidance needs to be developed by Brus­
sels in close cooperation with the EU­MS and del­
egations. As the strategic partners are quite dif­
ferent, the strategic partnerships’ contents, and to 
some extent the policy processes, will also be dif­
ferent. Yet the EU should ensure that the meetings 
between the respective parties are held regularly 
at several (working and high) levels, thereby en­
abling and supporting coordination and possibly 
cooperation with strategic partners to jointly ad­
dress global challenges and international topics.
Additionally, strategic partnerships are not an 
exclusively European instrument. Many countries 
maintain a variety of strategic partnerships of their 
own, establishing new partnerships while nurtur­
ing traditional ones. Strategic partnerships are and 
will be a (future) foreign policy tool of choice and 
a dominant characteristic in a multi polar world. 
They provide for flexibility, efficiency and dyna­
mism in (simultaneously) building a network of 
interest coalitions with several partners depend­
ing on the issue/policy areas. In a multipolar and 
multipower world, strategic partnerships enable 
the building up of influence, or “shaping power.” 
Thus, building a network of strategic partnerships 
will be a key strategy on the part of several actors 
– a strategy of cooperating while competing. This 
does not mean that the EU should establish stra­
tegic partnerships with each and every country in 
the world. Strategic partnerships need to remain 
something special and exclusive, limited in num­
ber. Inflationary tendencies endanger the very na­
ture and benefit of such a partnership. 
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